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Abstract
Volcanic unrest is complex and capable of producing multiple hazards that
can be triggered by a number of different subsurface processes. Scientiﬁc
interpretations of unrest data aim to better understand (i) the processes
behind unrest and their associated surface signals, (ii) their future
spatio-temporal evolution and (iii) their signiﬁcance as precursors for
future eruptive phenomena. In a societal context, additional preparatory or
contingency actions might be needed because relationships between and
among individuals and social groups will be perturbed and even changed
in the presence of signiﬁcant uncertainty. Here we analyse some key
examples from three international and multidisciplinary projects
(VUELCO, CASAVA and STREVA) where issues around the limits of
volcanic knowledge impact on volcanic risk governance. We provide an
overview of the regional and global context of volcanic unrest and
highlight scientiﬁc and societal challenges with a geographical emphasis
on the Caribbean and Latin America. We investigate why the forecasting
of volcanic unrest evolution and the exploitability of unrest signals to
forecast future eruptive behaviour and framing of response protocols is
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challenging, especially during protracted unrest. We explore limitations of
current approaches to decision-making and provide suggestions for how
future improvements can be made in the framework of holistic volcanic
unrest risk governance. We investigate potential beneﬁts arising from
improved communication, and framing of warnings around
decision-making timescales and hazard levels.
Resumen
La agitación volcánica es compleja y capaz de generar múltiples peligros
que pueden ser desencadenados por un número diferente de procesos
subsuperﬁciales. Las interpretaciones cientíﬁcas sobre datos de agitación
volcánica tienen como objetivo el mejor entendimiento de (i) los procesos
detrás de la agitación volcánica y sus señales superﬁciales asociadas, (ii) su
evolución espacial-temporal y (iii) su signiﬁcado como precursores de
fenómenos eruptivos a futuro. Dentro de un contexto social, acciones
adicionales preparatorias o de contingencia podrían ser requeridas debido a
que las relaciones entre individuos y dentro de grupos sociales serán
perturbadas e inclusive modiﬁcadas ante la presencia de incertidumbre
signiﬁcativa. Aquí nosotros analizamos algunos ejemplos clave a partir de
tres proyectos internacionales y multidisciplinarios (VUELCO, CASAVA
y STREVA) en los cuales las cuestiones alrededor de los límites del
conocimiento volcánico tienen impacto en la gestión pública del riesgo
volcánico. Proveemos una perspectiva general del contexto regional y
global de la agitación volcánica y sobresaltamos retos cientíﬁcos y sociales
con énfasis geográﬁco en el Caribe y América Latina. Investigamos porqué
el pronóstico de la evolución en la agitación volcánica y el aprovecha-
miento de señales de agitación volcánica para el pronóstico de compor-
tamiento eruptivo a futuro y el enmarque de protocolos de respuesta es un
reto, especialmente durante periodos de agitación prolongada (años a
décadas) en los que algunos retos surgen desde la utilización de señales de
agitación para pronosticar la evolución de agitación a largo plazo y sus
eventuales consecuencias. Exploramos las limitantes de actuales enfoques
para la toma de decisiones y proveemos sugerencias acerca de cómo
pueden hacerse reformas a futuro dentro del marco holístico de gobern-
abilidad ante el riesgo de agitación volcánica. Investigamos los potenciales
beneﬁcios que surgen por comunicación mejorada, y delimitando alertas
alrededor de escalas de tiempo para la toma de decisiones y los niveles de
alerta. Proponemos la necesidad de la cooperación a través de las fronteras
cientíﬁcas tradicionales, una valoración más amplia del riesgo natural y una
mayor interacción de los sectores interesados.
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1 Introduction
Volcanic unrest is a complex multi-hazard phe-
nomenon of volcanism. Although it is fair to
assume that probably all volcanic eruptions are
preceded by some form of unrest, the cause and
effect relationship between subsurface processes
and resulting unrest signals (geophysical or
geochemical data recorded at the ground surface,
phenomenological observations) is unclear and
surrounded by uncertainty (e.g., Wright and
Pierson 1992). Unrest may, or may not lead to
eruption in the short-term (days to months). If an
eruption were to ensue it may involve the erup-
tion of magma or may be non-magmatic and
mainly driven by expanding steam and hot water
(hydrothermal fluids) (Table 1). These conun-
drums contribute signiﬁcant uncertainty to
short-term hazard assessment and forecasting of
volcanic activity and have profound impact on
the management of unrest crises (e.g., Marzocchi
and Woo 2007).
While institutional and individual
decision-making in response to this unrest should
promote the efﬁcient and effective mitigation or
management of risk, informed decision-making
Table 1 Summary of processes contributing to unrest signals in space and time, possible outcomes and hazards/impact
of unrest
Nature of processes Processes Signals Hazards/Impact Unrest
Outcome
Magmatic Magma and/or melt
and/or volatile
migration (input,
loss or ascent from
reservoir), chemical
differentiation,
thermal convection,
thermal perturbation
(heating or cooling),
pore fluid migration
reservoir
rejuvenation,
crystallization and
other phase changes
Seismicity, ground
deformation,
changes in potential
ﬁelds, changes in
gas and/or ground
water chemistry,
changes in heat flux,
changes in volatile
flux
Ground
deformation,
shaking and rupture
and associated
infrastructure
damage; water table
level changes; toxic
gas emissions,
contamination of
ground water,
atmosphere and
crops; ediﬁce
destabilization; toxic
gas emissions
Waning and
return to
background
activity;
eruptive
activity
(magmatic
and/or
phreatic)
Tectonic/gravitational Faulting, changes in
local/regional stress
ﬁelds, ediﬁce
gravitational
spreading, crustal
loading, pore fluid
migration
Waning and
return to
background
activity;
eruptive
activity
(magmatic
and/or
phreatic)
Hydrothermal Fluid migration,
phase changes,
changes in
temperature and/or
pressure, chemical
changes, pore
pressure variations,
porosity and
permeability
changes (sealing),
host-rock alteration
Waning and
return to
background
activity;
phreatic
eruptive
activity
Processes can act individually, in unison or in any combination
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is fundamentally dependent on the early and
reliable identiﬁcation of changes in the subsur-
face dynamics of a volcano and their “correct”
assessment as precursors to an impending erup-
tion. However, uncertainties in identifying the
causative processes of unrest impact signiﬁcantly
on the ability to “correctly” forecast the
short-term evolution of unrest.
When a volcano evolves from dormancy
through a phase of unrest, scientiﬁc interpreta-
tions of data generated by this unrest relate to
(i) the processes behind unrest and their associ-
ated surface signals, (ii) their potential future
spatio-temporal evolution (i.e., hydrothermal vs.
phreatic vs. magmatic processes and their inten-
sity) and (iii) their signiﬁcance as precursors for
future eruptive phenomena. Scientiﬁc interpreta-
tions framed towards the governance of and
social responses to the risk implicit in the
potential onset of an eruption focus on: (i) un-
derstanding the epistemic (relating to the limits
of existing knowledge) and aleatoric (relating to
the intrinsic variability of natural processes)
uncertainties surrounding these data and their
impact on decision making and emergency
management, (ii) the communication of these
uncertainties to emergency managers and the
citizens at risk, and (iii) understanding how best
to manage evolving crises through the use of
forecasted scenarios.
2 Motivation
The analysis presented in this chapter synthesises
wider results and experiences gained in three
major research consortia with focus on volcanic
hazards and risks: (1) The VUELCO project,
(2) the CASAVA project, and (3) the STREVA
project.
The European Commission funded VUELCO
project (2011–2015; “Volcanic unrest in Europe
and Latin America: Phenomenology, eruption
precursors, hazard forecast, and risk mitigation;
www.vuelco.net) focused on multi-disciplinary
research on the origin, nature and signiﬁcance of
volcanic unrest and pre-eruptive processes from
the scientiﬁc contributions generated by collab-
oration of ten partners in Europe and Latin
America. Dissecting the science of monitoring
data from unrest periods at six target volcanoes
in Italy (Campi Flegrei caldera), Spain (Tener-
ife), the West Indies (Montserrat), Mexico
(Popocatepetl) and Ecuador (Cotopaxi) the con-
sortium created strategies for (1) enhanced
monitoring capacity and value, (2) mechanistic
data interpretation and (3) identiﬁcation of
eruption precursors and (4) crises stakeholder
interaction during unrest.
The CASAVA project (2010–2014; Agence
nationale de la recherche, France; Understanding
and assessing volcanic hazards, scenarios, and
risks in the Lesser Antilles—implications for
decision-making, crisis management, and prag-
matic development; https://sites.google.com/site/
casavaanr/, last accessed 11-10-2016) imple-
mented an original strategy of multi-disciplinary
fundamental research on the quantitative assess-
ment of volcanic risk for the Lesser Antilles
region with emphasis on Guadeloupe and Mar-
tinique. The aim of the project was to improve
the capacity to anticipate and manage volcanic
risks in order to reduce reactive ‘repairing’
post-crisis solutions and promote the emergence
of a society of proactive volcanic risk prevention
in case of a future eruption. Part of this was
achieved via a forensic analysis of past crises,
described here.
The STREVA Project (2012–2018 funded by
the UK Natural Environment and Economic and
Social Research Councils; www.streva.ac.uk)
was designed as a large interdisciplinary project
to develop new means to understand how vol-
canic risk should be assessed and framed. It uses
the ‘forensic’ interdisciplinary analysis of past
volcanic eruptions in four settings to understand
the key drivers of volcanic risk. The aim is to use
this analysis to generate future plans that will
reduce the negative consequences of future
eruptions on populations and their assets.
STREVA works closely with partners in the
Caribbean, Ecuador and Colombia, focussing the
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forensic analysis on long-lived eruptions of
Soufrière Hills Volcano (Montserrat) and Tun-
gurahua (Ecuador) and shorter duration eruptions
of La Soufrière (St. Vincent) and Nevado del
Ruiz (Colombia). The focus of the ‘forensic
analysis’ process in the STREVA project has
been to understand the key drivers of risk and
resilience during long-lived volcanic crises.
Nonetheless the analysis of the initial phases of
activity from these eruptions provide some
insights into the acute uncertainties of unrest and
the social, political and scientiﬁc consequences
of that uncertainty.
3 Volcanic Unrest: Scientific
and Social Context
Volcanic unrest can be deﬁned in a scientiﬁc
context: “The deviation from the background or
baseline behaviour of a volcano towards a
behaviour or state which is a cause for concern in
the short-term (hours to few months) because it
might prelude an eruption” (Phillipson et al.
2013). The term “eruption” in the context of a
possible unrest outcome could either relate to a
magmatic or non-magmatic (phreatic or
hydrothermal) origin including the possible
evolution from phreatic to magmatic activity or
an alternation or mix between the two (e.g.,
Rouwet et al. 2014). In a social context, these
concerns might necessitate additional preparatory
or contingency actions in response to the unrest
phenomena or the preparation for an eruption
given that the organisation and preparedness of
communities and those who manage them will be
perturbed and even changed in the context of
signiﬁcant uncertainty (Barclay et al. 2008 and
next section).
4 Challenges and Key Questions
Relating to Volcanic Unrest
4.1 Wider Perspective
Whether or not unrest results in eruption, either
of magmatic or non-magmatic origin, and
whether (in hindsight) “correct” or “false” fore-
casts are issued to suggest there could be an
imminent eruption are among the central ques-
tions that need answering as soon as unrest is
detected.
The cost of scientiﬁc uncertainty regarding the
causes and outcome of volcanic unrest may be
substantial not only in terms of direct or indirect
ﬁnancial implications such as explored in
Sect. 5, but also regarding knock-on (secondary)
effects such as public trust in the accuracy or
inaccuracy of scientiﬁc knowledge, public per-
ception of the relationships between signals of
unrest and volcanic risk and future public com-
pliance with orders to evacuate or improve pre-
paredness in the medium to long term.
A multitude of subsurface processes may
contribute to unrest signals and some are sum-
marised in Table 1. Not all processes are
pre-eruptive and the challenge lies in deciphering
the causes of unrest with a view to establish early
on in a developing crises whether a volcanic
system develops towards a state where an erup-
tion may ensue. Whether or not unrest leads to
eruption depends on many parameters. In general
the main concern during volcanic unrest lies with
the potential for a magmatic eruption. For this to
occur magma must rise from depth and break
through the surface. The dilemma for scientists is
that magma movement does not create uniquely
attributable unrest signals and does not neces-
sarily lead to eruption (Table 1). For example,
seismicity and ground uplift, both common
indicator of unrest, may be induced by the
replenishment of a magma reservoir, the ascent
of magma towards the surface or the redistribu-
tion of aqueous fluids and fluid phase changes
(see Salvage et al. 2017; Hickey et al. 2017;
Mothes et al. 2017 for examples from VUELCO
volcanoes). Similarly, an increase in the gas and
heat flux (Christopher et al. 2015) at the surface
may be induced by magmatic or hydrothermal
processes and even tectonic stress changes have
also been shown to trigger such behaviour (e.g.,
Hill et al. 1995). In fact, non-magmatic eruptions
are associated with signiﬁcant hazards and have
or could have caused fatalities in the past such as
for example Bandai in 1888 (Sekiya and Kikuchi
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1890), Te Maari Tongariro in 2012 (e.g., Jolly
et al. 2014) and recently at Ontake in 2014 (e.g.,
Maeno et al. 2016). Many unrest processes
contribute to non-eruptive secondary hazards
such as flank instability and collapse (e.g. Reid
2004).
4.2 Uncertain Causes and Uncertain
Effects
Substantial uncertainties surround both the
interpretation of the drivers of unrest and the
assessment of the potential evolution and out-
come of unrest. Critical questions include: Will
an eruption ensue? If so, will it occur in the
short-term (days to months) or long-term (years
to decades)? What will be the nature and inten-
sity of the eruption (magmatic vs. phreatic)?
In the case of magmatic unrest, magma ascent
towards the surface can lead to a magmatic
eruption with potential for the formation of lava
flows, pyroclastic flows, lahars, ash-fall and
ballistics. These processes impact the proximal
(few tens to hundreds of meters), medial (kilo-
meters) and distal (tens of kilometres or more)
areas around the volcano. Conversely unrest
driven by sub-surface hydrothermal activity may
peak in a phreatic eruption and while impacted
areas are rather proximal to the volcano, associ-
ated ballistics and dilute pyroclastic density
currents triggered by laterally-directed explo-
sions and emplacement of a debris avalanche
from a partial ediﬁce collapse can lead to an
anomalously high loss of lives as recently
shown by the September 27, 2014 Mount
Ontake eruption, the deadliest eruption in
more than 100 years in Japan (e.g. Maeno et al.
2016).
The challenge, however, is to identify and
discriminate signals that are indicative of reacti-
vation leading towards a major expulsion of
magmatic material from those associated with a
slight deviation from background levels and
potential waning of unrest phenomena (Table 1).
The fundamental limitation for volcanologists
is that it is not possible to directly observe cau-
sative processes at depth. Thus interpretations of
these drivers rely on the secondary interpretation
of observable signals associated with those pro-
cesses (Salvage et al. 2017) or the reproduction
of interpreted processes via laboratory experi-
ments (Wadsworth et al. 2016). In addition,
many volcanic processes are intrinsically
non-linear and characterized by a chain-link
reaction such that minor variations of some
uncertain parameters might have ultimately sig-
niﬁcant consequences on the eruptive outcome.
Such non-linear processes coupled with epis-
temic and aleatoric uncertainties are complex to
understand and model. This chapter analyses
some key examples across the three aforemen-
tioned projects where issues around the limits of
volcanic knowledge exacerbated risk and makes
suggestion for how future improvements can be
made.
4.3 The Hazard and Risk Interface
Scientific Challenges
In the light of the above, from a scientiﬁc point
of view the early identiﬁcation of the cause of
unrest and its likely outcome and evolution is
pivotal for effective and efﬁcient risk assessment,
risk management and the design of mitigation
efforts. In order to address the key scientiﬁc
question of whether unrest is a prelude to
imminent eruption or whether it will wane after
some time without eruption several questions
require answering ﬁrst (note, that the list is not
exhaustive):
• Is the anomalous behaviour unambiguously
indicative for a change in the volcano’s
behaviour and for a deviation from its back-
ground state?
• How reliable is the assessment of unrest as a
prelude to eruption, particularly in the
absence of data on past events?
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• What are the mechanistic processes at depth
leading to observed unrest signals?
• Are monitoring signals indicative of mag-
matic, hydrothermal or tectonic unrest?
• Can the unrest be caused by perturbations and
changes in the host-rock properties (e.g.
porosity, permeability, mechanical properties)
rather than by distinct endogenic processes of
hydrothermal or magmatic origin?
• What are the uncertainties surrounding mon-
itoring signals and inferred sub-surface pro-
cesses (see Hickey et al. 2017 and Salvage
et al. 2017)?
• Do secondary processes (e.g. hydrothermal
system perturbation, meteorological forcing)
modify primary signals from deeper-seated
magmatic processes?
• What are the consequences of signal modiﬁ-
cation for the assessment of the
process-to-signal-to-outcome causal link?
• Does one follow a deterministic or proba-
bilistic approach for observations and fore-
casting (e.g., Hincks et al. 2014; Aspinall and
Woo 2014; Rouwet et al. 2017)?
• What is the likelihood of a speciﬁc eruptive or
non-eruptive scenario to manifest (e.g., Bar-
tolini et al. 2017)?
• Which types of eruptions did the volcano
produce in the past?
• If an eruption is to occur, what is its likely
nature: magmatic, or phreatic or a mix?
• How much lead-time before eruption is there
based on previous experience; how much
lead-time is there in the absence of previous
experience?
• Which eruptive or non-eruptive unrest epi-
sodes at analogue volcanoes can provide
clues for the interpretation of signals and
forecasting of unrest evolution and outcome
(e.g., Sheldrake et al. 2016)?
• What is the likely size of the eruption and the
associated hazards and risks and impacted
area?
• What is the temporal evolution of eruptive
intensity once the eruption has started? i.e.,
what is the likelihood that the eruption
(a) will have its paroxysmal phase in the ﬁrst
24 h of eruption (42% of eruptions do,
according to Siebert et al. (2015)); or (b) will
have a more progressive escalation over
several months that will culminate in a
paroxysm; or (c) will be characterised by
peaks in activity separated by more or less
long-lasting pauses or strong decline of
activity preceding another rapid increase and
peak of activity?
Societal Challenges
At the same time, the political, sociological,
cultural and economic (grouped here under the
term ‘societal’) implications from unrest need
addressing in order to respond appropriately to
the emerging natural hazard (Wynne 1992) Here
we provide a (non-exhaustive) list of questions
for risk managers and/or politicians in the context
of risk governance during volcanic unrest:
• What is the best-practice to provide maxi-
mum response time, while minimizing vul-
nerability and optimizing the cost/beneﬁt
ratio (see Fig. 1) of mitigation actions in a
developing unrest crises?
• What is the best practice to issue or raise an
alert?
• When and how to decide to raise an alert and
to take action?
• What are the potential (legal) consequences
of a false positive or false negative (see
Table 2 and Bretton et al. 2015)?
• What are the consequences of a true positive
(Table 2)?
• What is the basis for raising an alarm: the
outcomes of unrest (e.g., instability of build-
ings due to ground deformation or seismicity;
toxic degassing and environmental contami-
nation) or the potential for eruption?
• How to best disseminate what information on
unrest and its potential consequences, when,
and via which communication vehicle(s) to
the public?
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• How to account for uncertainty and the
diversity of expert opinions in deciding the
alert level?
• In what context does this occur such as
political pressures, concurrent natural or other
hazards (pandemic, famine, cyclone, etc.)
Fig. 1 Cost-beneﬁt relationship as a tool for decision-
making. a In the context of volcanic unrest risk manage-
ment, actions of given quantity Q (for example, number of
shelters or evacuees) are associated with costs in relation to
their expected beneﬁts (expressed by a ﬁnancial value). An
optimal relationship between costs of mitigation efforts
and resultant beneﬁts can be achieved when the difference
between investment and beneﬁt is greatest (shown by
stippled red line). The example is based on concepts of
capital management theory presented in Brealey et al.
(2011). b Cost (C) versus loss (L) model for volcanic risk
management (after Marzocchi and Woo 2007). If, in this
decision-making framework, the expected expense (cost)
for mitigation action is to be minimised, then action is
required if the probability (p) of an adverse event to occur
exceeds the ratio between the cost of the action and the
expected loss (L/C). See discussion for a wider appraisal of
the challenges arsing from such an analysis
Table 2 Concept of
successful and unsuccessful
forecasting
Event forecast Event not forecast
Event occurs True positive False negative
(Type II error)
Event does not occur False positive
(Type I error)
True negative
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4.4 Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA)
In the previous paragraphs, several questions
related to how to get both the scientiﬁc analysis
(‘what is going on?’) and the societal response
(‘how to respond?’) ‘right’. One measure
employed to quantify the economic consequences
of action or no-action under imminent threat and a
tool for informed institutional decision-making is
the cost-beneﬁt analysis (Marzocchi and Woo
2007) whereby one aims to ﬁnd a good answer to
the question: “Given an assessment of costs and
beneﬁts related to risk mitigation efforts, which
actions should be recommended?”Figure 1 shows
the concept of evaluating the optimum ratio
between the cost and beneﬁt of mitigation efforts
and provides a cost-beneﬁt matrix for the design of
action plans in response to a future [short-term in
context of this chapter) adverse event of given
probability (p) (Brealey et al. 2011;Marzocchi and
Woo 2007)]. A critical issue in CBA is the ‘min-
imum value of a human life’, which we will not
discuss further here. The interested reader is
referred to, for example, Woo (2015) for further
details on this quantiﬁcation. Another interesting
point relates to what might be regarded as a ‘cost’
and a ‘beneﬁt’ in a response to an unfolding unrest
crisis with an uncertain outcome (see also Sect. 6).
5 Global and Regional Context
of Volcanic Unrest
5.1 Unrest Durations
and Characteristics
Phillipson et al. (2013) reviewed global unrest
reports of the Smithsonian Institution Global
Volcanism Program (GVP) between January
2000 and July 2011 to establish the nature and
length of unrest activity, to test whether there are
common temporal patterns in unrest indicators
and to test whether there is a link between the
length of inter-eruptive periods and unrest dura-
tion across different volcano types.
Using available formation on unrest at 228
volcanoes they deﬁned unrest timelines to
demonstrate how unrest evolved over time and
highlight different classes of unrest including
reawakening, pulsatory, prolonged, sporadic and
intra-eruptive unrest (see Fig. 2 for an example
from Cotopaxi volcano). Statistical analyses of
the data indicate that pre-eruptive unrest (where
there is a causal link between unrest and an
eruption within the observation period) duration
was different across different volcano types with
50% of stratovolcanoes erupting within one
month of reported unrest. The median average
Fig. 2 Timeline of reported anomalous activity at
Cotopaxi volcano (Ecuador) in 2001/2002. This period
of pulsatory unrest lasted for more than 3 years with a
heightened level of activity in 2001 and 2002. The unrest
did not lead to an eruption in the short-term (weeks to
months), but Cotopaxi entered an eruptive phase in
August 2015 after a short-period of renewed unrest
activity starting in April 2015 (see Mothes et al. 2017 for
details). The data shown in the graph are from Phillipson
et al. (2013)
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duration of pre-eruptive unrest at large calderas
was about two months, while at shield volcanoes
a median average ﬁve months of unrest was
reported before eruptive activity. The shortest
median average duration is reported for complex
volcanoes where eruptive unrest was short at
only two days. Overall there appears to be only a
very weak correlation between the length of the
inter-eruptive period and pre-eruptive unrest
duration. This may indicate that volcanoes with
long periods of quiescence between eruptions
will not necessarily undergo prolonged periods
of unrest before their next eruption (Fig. 3).
Phillipson et al. (2013) found statistically rele-
vant information only from reports of anomalous
seismic behaviour, most other monitoring signals
are either not recorded or not reported as unrest
criteria. The authors reported a noteworthy lack
of geodetic data/information and in particular
satellite remote sensing data in the available
reports. Recently Biggs et al. (2014), addressed
the latter and systematically analysed 198 vol-
canoes with more than 18 years of satellite
remote sensing deformation data for their defor-
mation behaviour. 54 volcanoes that showed
deformation also erupted during the observation
period. Their analysis does not imply any causal
link, or even a temporal relationship between any
speciﬁc eruptions and episodes of deformation
and is hence not directly comparable to the
causal and predictive analysis by Phillipson et al.
(2013). However, given that 46% of deforming
volcanoes erupted while 94% of non-deforming
volcanoes did not erupt provides “strong evi-
dential worth of using deformation data as a trait
association with eruption” (Biggs et al. 2014).
It is important to note that exploitable records
on volcanic unrest are limited and the available
Fig. 3 Comparison between the inter-eruptive period
(IEP) and unrest duration (UD) from the data set
presented in Phillipson et al. (2013). a shows entire data
set (n = 118) b shows a subset of the data for clarity of
inter-eruptive periods <150 years. The p-values of the
Pearson’s correlation test are p = 0.93 for the entire data
set, p = 0.60 for the subset of non-eruptive unrest
(n = 58) and p = 0.20 for the subset of eruptive unrest
(n = 60). The null hypothesis (“the UD is independent of
the IEP”) is hence statistically acceptable when consid-
ering the entire data set. Considering the subset of
pre-eruptive unrest, however, the statistical tests do not
provide enough evidence to fully accept the null hypoth-
esis since the associated p-value of 0.20 might
hint towards some weak correlation between the two
variables
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data sets are far from complete. Key issues are
the lack of or poor instrumentation at most vol-
canoes, the lack of reporting by observers par-
ticularly if an unrest turns out to be minor and
without immediate consequences, and the lack of
integrating unrest data from satellite remote
sensing. The GVP generally lacks the post-facto
integration of unrest indicators from satellite-
remote sensing data (e.g., Fournier et al. (2010)
and Biggs et al. (2014) for deformation and Carn
et al. (2011) for degassing). In this respect, it is
vitally important to recognise and support ini-
tiatives to collate and exploit worldwide volcano
monitoring data such as for example the
WOVOdat project (Venezky and Newhall 2007).
Only by signiﬁcantly increasing the knowledge-
base on the spatial and temporal evolution of the
unrest-eruption relationship can we embark on
statistically sound exploitations of the data with a
potential to improve forecasting capabilities early
on in developing unrest crises.
5.2 Socio-Economic Contexts
The Wider Perspective
Nowadays, about 800 million people live on or in
direct vicinity of active volcanoes (Brown et al.
2015). The overwhelming majority of this pop-
ulation lives in low and middle income countries
(countries with an annual gross national income
per capita of less than US$12,700) including the
focus area of the VUELCO, STREVA and
CASAVA projects: the wider Latin American
(LA) region extending from Mexico, through
Central America and the Caribbean to South
America. This region hosts about 330 Holocene
volcanic centres compared to 84 in Europe and
one quarter of the reported global fatalities
attributed to volcanic events occurred there
(Global Volcanism Program 2013).
Volcanic disasters are among the least audited
of all natural disasters and therefore our knowl-
edge on the impact of volcanic activity beyond
claiming lives is largely incomplete (Benson
2006; Auker et al. 2013). Huge uncertainty sur-
round estimates for indirect losses from for
example disease or starvation as a result of vol-
canic activity. Beyond increased human vulner-
ability, the direct and indirect ﬁnancial impacts
from volcanic activity can be immense as
demonstrated by the relatively small-scale erup-
tion of Iceland’s Eyjafjallajökull volcano in April
2010 and the associated air travel disruption.
This eruption demonstrated the vulnerability of
modern infrastructure to volcanic hazards on an
unprecedented scale with losses to the aviation
industry alone at a minimum of US$2.5 Billion
(European Commission 2010).
Equally there are social, political and ﬁnancial
implications for “false positives” related to vol-
canic unrest. In these instances actions are taken in
response to an imminent threat, which then did not
manifest. In the case of volcanic unrest the
imminent threat is generally deﬁned as a volcanic
eruption, although the multi-hazard nature of vol-
canic unrest (e.g., ground shaking, ground uplift or
subsidence, ground rupture, ground instability,
toxic gas emissions, contaminated water supplies)
and possibly ensuing eruptive activity (magmatic
vs. phreatomagmatic vs. phreatic) makes the deﬁ-
nition of ‘imminent threat’ rather complex.
Although there is little systematic gathering
and synthesis of data relating to ﬁnancial or
social losses associated with these episodes there
are some well-documented analyses. Examples
include:
(1) On Guadeloupe in the French West Indies a
major evacuation over a period of 4 months
in excess of 70,000 individuals was initiated
in 1976, as a result of abnormal levels of
volcanic seismicity and degassing (see also
next section). The estimated cost of the
unrest was about US$340 Million at the 1976
exchange rate (data compiled using Lepointe
1999; Tazieff 1980; Blérald 1986; Baunay
1998; Kokelaar 2002; Annen and Wagner
2003), which translates to more than US$ 1.2
Billion at the time of this writing (July 2016).
At the time the cost equaled to ca. 60% of the
Gross National Product of the Guadeloupe
economy (Blérald 1986). 90% of these costs
were incurred by the costs of the evacuation,
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and the costs associated with the rehabilita-
tion and salvage of the economy in Guade-
loupe after the evacuation.
(2) Unrest at Rabaul volcano in Papua New
Guinea (an LDC) between 1983 and 1985,
had signiﬁcant adverse implications for both
the private and public sectors. Considerable
economic costs were incurred, estimated at
over US$22.2 Million at the 1984 rate of
exchange although an eruption did not occur
until 10 years later (Benson 2006).
(3) Evacuation and rehousing of 40,000 inhabi-
tants of the Pozzuoli area in the Campi Fle-
grei volcanic area of Italy resulted as a
response to intense seismicity and ground
uplift in the early 1980s. Although decision-
makers did not release notice that this was in
part due to the threat from an imminent
eruption (see also Sect. 4.3.2), it is true that
the re-location of these inhabitants moved
them from the area of highest threat in the
event of an eruption. At the time there was
no agreement amongst scientists as to the
cause of the unrest (Barberi et al. 1984) and
the scientiﬁc discussion as to the cause of
these events is still ongoing more than
30 years after the crisis.
The following paragraphs focus on two examples
of short-term and long-term volcanic unrest cri-
ses response and provide more detailed insights
into the volcanic risk governance in two different
jurisdictions.
Short-Term Crisis Example: The 1976–
1977 La Soufrière of Guadeloupe Unrest
The unrest on Guadeloupe culminated in a series
of explosive eruptions of hot gas, mud and rock
(termed phreatic eruption) without the direct
eruption of magma before waning in 1977
(Feuillard et al. 1983; Komorowski et al. 2005;
Hincks et al. 2014). Fortunately no fatalities
were caused by the activity. Had the unrest on
Guadeloupe led to a magmatic eruption, then the
cost of the unrest would have likely been neg-
ligible. Although the precautionary evacuation
caused a substantial economic loss with severe
social consequences, it is acknowledged that the
“proportion of evacuees who would have owed
their lives to the evacuation, had there been a
major eruption, was substantial” (Woo 2008).
The CASAVA project undertook an exhaustive
hindsight analysis of the process of scientiﬁc
decision-making for the unrest and eruptive
crisis of 1976–1977 at La Soufrière de Guade-
loupe. The crisis caused signiﬁcant hardships
and loss of livelihood for the evacuated popu-
lation and the whole society in Guadeloupe as a
result of controversial crisis management asso-
ciated with a forecast of a major magmatic
eruption that did not occur (false positive)
(Feuillard et al. 1983; Fiske 1984; Komorowski
et al. 2005; Hincks et al. 2014). Given the evi-
dence of continued escalating pressurisation and
the uncertain transition to a devastating mag-
matic eruption, authorities declared a 4-month
evacuation of ca. 70,000 people on August 15,
1976 that provoked severe socio-economical
consequences for months to years thereafter.
This evacuation is still perceived as unnecessary
and reflecting an exaggerated use of the “prin-
ciple of precaution” on behalf of the
government.
However, some level of risk governance (i.e.
evacuation of the most exposed area) was justi-
ﬁed in hindsight given the persistent ashfalls and
environmental contamination from acid degas-
sing as well as the hazards from a series of
non-magmatic eruptions (e.g., pyroclastic flows
from laterally directed explosions, partial ediﬁce
collapse, mudflows) (Komorowski et al. 2005;
Hincks et al. 2014).
The (in hindsight) erroneous identiﬁcation of
the presence of ‘fresh glass’ in the ejecta and its
interpretation as evidence of the magmatic origin
of the unrest and thus of its possible outcome, led
to a major controversy amongst scientists that
was widely echoed in the media. Lack of a
comprehensive monitoring network prior to the
crisis, limited knowledge of the eruptive history,
and living memory of past devastating eruptions
in the Lesser Antilles contributed to a high
degree of scientiﬁc uncertainty and a publically-
expressed lack of consensus and trust in available
expertise. Consequently analysis, forecast, and
crisis response were highly challenging for
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scientists and authorities in the context of esca-
lating and fluctuating activity and societal pres-
sure. The high uncertainty about a so-called
“unequivocal” impending disaster fostered a
binary zero-sum strongly opinionated approach
in the scientiﬁc discourse. The public debate thus
became polarized on issues of opposing “truths”
served by contrasted scientiﬁc expertise rather
than on how science could help constrain epis-
temic and aleatoric uncertainty and foster
improved decision-making in the context of
uncertainty (Komorowski et al. 2017). This sit-
uation acted as an ideal crucible to fuel a
media-hyped controversy on the crisis and its
management. A recent retrospective Bayesian
Belief Network analysis of this crisis (Hincks
et al. 2014) demonstrates that a formal evidential
case could have been made to support the
authorities’ concerns about public safety and
decision to evacuate in 1976.
As part of the CASAVA project we conducted
focus group interviews, issued questionnaires,
and ran role playing games with the population
currently living in areas potentially threatened by
renewed unrest and eruptive activity from La
Soufrière, (be it magmatic or non-magmatic). We
found that the current population’s risk percep-
tion increases to a level of preparing to evacuate
chiefly on the basis of the timing and nature of
scientiﬁc information issued publically by the
volcano observatory. This implies that the pop-
ulation is prone to self-evacuate ahead of any
ofﬁcial evacuation order given by the authorities
in charge of civil protection and crisis response.
Long-Term Crises Examples: Soufrière
Hills (Montserrat) and Tungurahua
(Ecuador)
The forensic analyses of the STREVA project
have focussed on the integration of new
social-science based understandings of popula-
tion response and recovery with the scientiﬁc
insights prompted by these long-lived eruptions.
This has similarities with the ‘FORIN’ approach
advocated by the International Program on Inte-
grated Risk for Disaster Reduction (Burton
2010). In this description we focus particularly
on the initial stages of the eruptions.
The long-lived volcanic crisis of the Soufrière
Hills Volcano is probably one of the most written
about volcanic eruptions, encompassing a wide
variety of perspectives, scientiﬁc, social-
scientiﬁc and personal, in that writing. As a
consequence of the activity on the island of
Montserrat a population of over 10,500 was
reduced to just 2850 (the population has since
risen to 4922 [2011 census], Hicks and Few
2015). At the onset of eruption (1995) an
assessment of risk existed (Wadge and Isaacs
1988) but was not acted on or acknowledged by
the authorities, and so preparedness was low,
exacerbated by the recent passage of Hurricane
Hugo (1989) which had caused 11 fatalities and
rendered 3000 homeless. Governance on
Montserrat was reforming in the wake of the
economic and social crisis induced by the hurri-
cane (Wilkinson 2015). The protracted uncer-
tainty in the early stages of the eruption coupled
with a lack of coherence in governance between
the UK and local governments lead to the pro-
tracted evacuation of 1300 people in temporary
public shelters, which suffered from overcrowd-
ing, lack of privacy, poor sanitation and lack of
access to good nutrition. Ultimately, this led to a
partial disregard for evacuation advice and a
strong pulse of outwards migration. In the longer
term, the long-lived volcanic eruption has acted
to exaggerate pre-existing vulnerabilities in the
local population (Hicks and Few 2015).
The early stages of the current Tungurahua
(Ecuador) eruptive episode that started in 1999
typify a further challenge for the management of
unrest prior to or between surface activity at the
early stages of a volcanic crisis. Initially the local
population were evacuated by a compulsory
evacuation order but when the initial phases
proceeded more slowly than had been expected
by local authorities and communities, civil unrest
and disturbance happened with the re-occupation
by force and ultimately abandonment of the
evacuation order. These arose from the acute
economic and social pressures visited on the
population by the evacuation (Mothes et al.
2015). Subsequently, the response of the moni-
toring organisation to these pressures represents a
new archetype for collaborative monitoring and
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management of restive volcanoes (Mothes et al.
2015; Stone et al. 2014). The growth of trust, and
attempts to maximise resilience in the face of
repeated unrest episodes provides strong evi-
dence for collaborative approaches to risk man-
agement (Few et al. 2017). Nonetheless tensions
still exist, largely arising from our current inca-
pacity to predict the intensity or magnitude of
eruptions from signals relating to new unrest.
There can be problems in this risk system
implicit in anticipating the ‘maximum expected’
outcome from unrest.
6 Discussion
6.1 The Caveats of Volcanic Unrest
Response
Managing volcanic unrest episodes is extremely
complex and challenging due to the multi-hazard
nature of unrest. The risks to be assessed and
mitigated include both those associated with the
unrest itself as well as those from the potential
future eruptive activity. Whilst ground deforma-
tion, seismicity, thermal flux or anomalous
degassing are indicators of possible future
activity these phenomena also pose signiﬁcant
immediate threats to population, infrastructure
and other assets in affected areas during the
unrest.
From a scientiﬁc point of view, hazard
assessment relating to eruptive activity has made
considerable progress in recent years partly
through the deployment of increasingly powerful
computational models and simulation capabilities
(e.g., Esposti Ongaro et al. 2007; Manville et al.
2013) as well as through advances in the devel-
opment of probabilistic eruption forecasting tools
(e.g., Marzocchi et al. 2008; Aspinall 2006;
Aspinall and Woo 2014) and improvements to
fundamental understandings of the root drivers of
changing activity (e.g., Cashman and Sparks
2013).
Despite these crucial advances for short-term
eruption forecasting, the knowledge-base on
volcanic unrest, its signiﬁcance as an eruption
precursor, its exploitability regarding forecasting
of potential eruptive behaviours and framing of
response protocols (e.g., CBA) remains weak for
a number of reasons:
(1) The scientiﬁc interpretation of volcanic
unrest is surrounded by substantial uncer-
tainty, ambiguity and ignorance (Stirling
2010) regarding causes and eventual out-
come. Since the contributing subsurface
processes cannot be directly observed, vol-
canic unrest is likely among the least
understood phenomena in volcanology for a
variety of reasons:
(i) Incomplete knowledge of the mechanistic
processes and their dynamic behaviour over
time within a magma reservoir and its sur-
roundings (host-rock, hydrothermal system,
meteoric recharge, local and regional
structural context) that trigger the geo-
physical, geochemical and geodetic signals
recorded at the surface during unrest peri-
ods (Table 1).
(ii) Consequently, the interpretation, of the
departure of monitoring signals from a
long-term baseline level or in the absence of
baseline data a crescendo or decrescendo of
signals collected during periods of unrest are
often ambiguous or non-unique. While this
can in practice be addressed in models
through epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties,
ambiguities in the interpretation will remain.
(2) Ambiguity, uncertainty and ignorance (Stir-
ling 2010) have impact on probabilistic
forecasting of duration, spatio-temporal
evolution, causal relationship between
sequential events and outcomes of unrest
episodes (see Sandri et al. 2017) and on
remedial actions to mitigate current and
future adverse effects. Uncertainties in the
decision-making process may give rise to
“false alerts” (i.e., false positives; see
Table 2) and actions by civil protection with
adverse impacts on the compliance of
affected communities in future unrest events.
(3) Lack of globally accepted and standardised
approach for the terminology, methodology,
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criteria, protocols and best practice
employed to evaluate and respond to vol-
canic unrest by different stakeholders such
as academia, volcano observatories and the
Civil Protection Agencies. This absence of
commonly recognised standards can result
in the critical issue of managerial risk vul-
nerability (i.e., standard equivocality’ after
Bretton et al. 2015). It also often impacts
negatively on the effectiveness of commu-
nication between stakeholders, hinders or
delays effective and efﬁcient decision-
making processes and hampers the dia-
logue among members of scientiﬁc, gov-
ernmental and civil communities (De la
Cruz-Reyna and Tilling 2008). However, it
is important to note that internationally-
deﬁned standards should not be rigidly
imposed irrespective of local, cultural,
political and social practices (e.g., Bretton
et al. 2015; IAVCEI 2016).
(4) Globally, there is no commonly accepted
and standardised denominator between
those that provide and those that receive
scientiﬁc advice regarding the level of
appropriate scientiﬁc complexity to be
considered. This may hamper a wider dis-
course on scientiﬁc and technological
advances in the quantiﬁcation of unrest
phenomena and resultant uncertainties with
other stakeholders. From the scientist’s
perspective this may generate the notion
that the public, administrators, mass media
and governmental entities do not appreciate
the “excellence of the science” behind
unrest characterisation and use the inherent
uncertainty as a rationale to go into denial
over the hazards posed during unrest. From
a sociological point of view, however,
decision-making apparently prompted
solely by the present or likely volcanic
hazards, does not account for local context
and can result in a lack of trust in either
scientiﬁc expertise or government repre-
sentatives, (Johnson 1987; Haynes et al.
2008; Christie et al. 2015; Komorowski
et al. 2017).
6.2 Some Ways Forward
The issues identiﬁed above can contribute less
optimal unrest response and risk mitigation
actions. Although there are other strong con-
tributors to societal vulnerability, we have shown
that scientiﬁc uncertainty combined with a lack
of social awareness and preparedness does act to
increase the vulnerability of a society to haz-
ardous unrest phenomena with possibly adverse
outcomes. Here, we propose future avenues
which can form part of a Risk Governance
Framework (IGRC 2017; Fig. 4) including
research that could gather critical evidence for
some of the key drivers of decisions that result in
adverse outcomes for affected populations in the
face of an unrest crisis. Such research could also
contribute to the analysis of and identiﬁcation of
key targets for future research in volcanology
and the social sciences.
(a) Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis
CBA, where the economic impacts of different
decisions are quantiﬁed, can be difﬁcult at the
unrest hazard and risk interface. The case studies
presented here demonstrate that intangible assets
such as social and cultural cohesion and capital
as well as trust (in the context of CBA analysis
this would be intentional trust in the sense of
Dasgupta (1988); i.e., the subjective probability
assigned to compassionate action by an individ-
ual or a group of individuals) between different
stakeholders can have a strong impact on indi-
vidual and institutional vulnerabilities during
crises.
Analyses that include a wider range of deﬁ-
nitions and types of ‘costs’ and ‘beneﬁts’ of
mitigation efforts (e.g. loss of empowerment, a
loss of cultural identity or cultural references),
informed by past experiences would facilitate a
discourse between different stakeholders. This
would entail the need to attribute a ﬁnancial
value to, for example, mental well-being, social
networks and cohesions and would necessarily
trigger a wider discourse of the impacts of
decision-making beyond the avoidance of ‘cost
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to lives’. Ideally this discourse would be framed
during ‘peace-time’ (i.e. not in response to an
unfolding unrest crisis) and involve participation
from a wide spectrum of scientiﬁc and societal
stakeholders. The necessity to move beyond
circumscribed appraisal methods such as the
CBA is also evident from the response to
protracted (several years or decades) unrest
requiring an above back-ground level of
long-term vigilance (e.g. yellow/vigilance level
for La Soufrière of Guadeloupe since 1999,
Komorowski et al. 2005; OVSG-IPGP 1999–
2016 or at the Campi Flegrei caldera since 1969;
Ricci et al. 2013). In such cases there are obvious
long-term strategies that could be developed to
improve social well-being and economic devel-
opment (e.g. developing resilient critical infras-
tructures such as roads, bridges, public electrical
water and sewer systems and communications
networks) that would signiﬁcantly enhance the
quality of life for years of “peace time” from the
volcano while ensuring a more efﬁcient crisis
response and recovery should the volcano erupt
and impact the society.
(b) Improved communication
Open and multi-directional communication pro-
cesses are of paramount importance in fostering
the development of a shared representation and
understanding among all stakeholders of the
nature, magnitude, dynamics, and societal and
environmental consequences of unrest and its
potential eruptive outcome on multiple spatio-
temporal scales (e.g. Barclay et al. 2008, 2015;
Komorowski et al. 2017). While communicating
this information in a timely and comprehensible
format is challenging, the evidence presented
here suggests that a continuous discourse is
needed between different stakeholders ideally
both before, during and after an unrest situation.
The case studies presented here demonstrate that
part of this discourse should involve a discussion
about the appropriate scientiﬁc complexity in the
communication between scientiﬁc and
non-scientiﬁc stakeholders is essential, so that
the information exchange is ‘useful, usable and
used’ (Aitsi-Selmi et al. 2016) and ﬁt for the
decision-making purpose to which it is intended
(Fischhoff 2013). Wider discourse could for
example include regular information bulletins
from monitoring agents to the civil society and
authorities, the development of scenario-based
approaches in simulation exercises involving the
civil society and the wider appraisal of less
Fig. 4 The International Risk Governance Council
(IRGC 2017) Risk Governance Framework adapted for
the speciﬁc case of volcanic unrest. Hazard and Risk
Pre-assessment—“peacetime framing” the hazard and risk
in order to provide a structured deﬁnition of the baseline
behaviour of the volcano and its consequences, of how the
hazard and risk are framed by different stakeholders, of
how the risk may best be handled, and of the thresholds to
be met or exceeded to declare a state of unrest. Hazard
and Risk Appraisal—combining a scientiﬁc risk assess-
ment of the current unrest hazards (using for example a
rating scheme of unrest intensity, e.g., Potter et al. 2015)
and its probability with a systematic concern assessment
(of public concerns and perceptions) to provide the
knowledge base for subsequent decisions in an emerging
unrest crises. Risk Characterisation and Evaluation—in
which the scientiﬁc data and a thorough understanding of
societal values affected by the risk are used to evaluate the
risk as acceptable, tolerable (requiring mitigation), or
intolerable (unacceptable). Risk Management—the
actions and remedies needed to avoid, reduce transfer or
retain the unrest risk and risks from probable unrest
outcomes. Risk Communication—how stakeholders and
civil society understand the unrest risk and participate in
the risk governance process. Risk Categorisation and
Evaluation—categorising the knowledge about the
cause-effect relationships as either simple, complex,
uncertain or ambiguous. In the context of volcanic unrest
this may include the categorisation of the outcome of
unrest and probable future eruptive activity
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tangible ‘assets’ (i.e., live stock or cultural cap-
ital) in risk governance efforts.
Dialogues between those responsible for
monitoring hazards and those responsible for
managing risk, as well as the communities at risk
cannot only help to understand the most impor-
tant aspects of scientiﬁc information to convey
but could also lead to an improved understanding
of the context into which emergency response
actions must be made (e.g. Christie et al. 2015),
and encourage citizens at risk to act on advice. In
particular more systematic studies that analyse
the effectiveness of different techniques and
strategies in achieving these goals would be
very useful (see Fearnley et al. 2017 for a recent
compilation). These efforts should help address
reluctance by the public to follow emergency-
response advice in an emerging unrest
crises.
(c) Wider natural risk appraisal
In a similar vein, the implementation of advice
on volcanic risk could be more effective if it is
considered in the context of other natural risks
and social challenges (e.g., Wilkinson et al.
2016). By deﬁnition the onset of a volcanic
eruption involves the anticipation of impacts
from multiple hazards but the risk associated
with volcanic hazards are often considered in
isolation, and as a low probability, high conse-
quence hazard, ignored in advance of an unrest
crisis. This lack of dialogue and preparation has
been identiﬁed above as a strong contributor to
tensions during unrest crises. Volcanic regions
only very rarely suffer solely from the impacts of
a single natural hazard (e.g. volcanic small-island
developing states discussed in Wilkinson et al.
2016; Komorowski et al. 2017). Therefore
methods that consider the multi-hazard context
more clearly may ultimately help communities at
risk cope with uncertainty in face of volcanic
hazards. This may be particularly the case, if they
are able to identify ‘co-beneﬁts’ during volcano
“peace time” where preparedness or mitigation
measures yield beneﬁts for more than one hazard
scenario (Wilkinson et al. 2016). This improve-
ment of social well-being is likely to allow the
society to take better decisions when times of
impeding adversity arise.
(d) Framing of warnings around
decision-making timescales and hazard level
Typically changes in alert levels are strongly tied
to pre-determined changes in geophysical and
geochemical signals or phenomenological
observations and have carefully worked out
associated actions. In our case studies, difﬁculties
have arisen when the time-scale over which
mitigating actions can be taken is much shorter
than needed to implement mitigating actions
such as evacuation or much longer than the
timescale over which unrest or new eruptive
activity impacts on the population at risk. In the
case of the former, lives or assets may be put at
risk and in the case of the latter, possessions and
livelihoods can be negatively impacted with
repercussions on trust and political stability.
Managing decade or longer periods of protracted
moderate-level unrest amid signiﬁcant epistemic
and aleatoric uncertainty on its outcome consti-
tutes major challenges for scientists, authorities,
the population, and the media.
The development of novel probabilistic for-
malism for decision-making could help reduce
scientiﬁc uncertainty and better assist public
ofﬁcials in making urgent evacuation decisions
and policy choices should the current and
ongoing unrest lead to renewed eruptive activity.
To improve decision-making around changing
alert or hazard levels, improved modelling efforts
of the time-scales and pathways of population
mobilisation or actions (both as forward mod-
elling and as analysis of past events) and better
understanding of the consequences of protracted
unrest or eruptive activity on the vulnerabilities
of affected populations (e.g. Few et al. 2017)
could improve choices to be made in responding
to changing or escalating activity as well as
chain-link scenarios.
Further, focussing on the time-scales associ-
ated with the responses to unrest (from the time
taken to mobilise populations in an acute emer-
gency, to the time-limits of tolerability of evac-
uation processes and ﬁnally the time-scales over
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which services and livelihoods deteriorate in
response to protracted unrest) could provide
important indicators for the time-scales over
which alert levels (and attendant actions) need
attention. In turn this perspective could inform
scientiﬁc targets for improved forecasting, with
strong effort expended to reduce uncertainty over
time intervals that match those most critical to
effective societal action.
7 Conclusions
We have identiﬁed a number of scientiﬁc and
sociological problems surrounding volcanic
unrest and have highlighted key aspects of risk
governance at the interface between scientists,
emergency managers and wider societal stake-
holders. We have in particular focussed on the
issue of scientiﬁc uncertainty and its impact on
preparatory or contingency actions that might be
needed because relationships between and
among individuals and social groups will be
perturbed or even changed. Especially, during
periods of protracted unrest (years to decades)
challenges arise from the exploitability of unrest
signals to forecast long-term unrest evolution and
its eventual outcome. This impacts directly on
establishing the probability for and the timing
and type of future eruptive behaviour as well as
the deﬁnition of appropriate response protocols.
To improve communication and trust between
stakeholders as well as the framing of warnings
around decision-making timescales and hazard
levels of unrest, we propose that bridging across
traditional scientiﬁc boundaries, wider natural
risk appraisal and broader stakeholder interaction
is needed.
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